Bank Capital Regulation With Random Audits

Sudipto Bhattacharya, Manfred Plank, Josef Zechner and Günter Strobl

FMG Discussion Papers from Financial Markets Group

Abstract: We consider a model of optimal bank closure rules (cum capital replenishment by banks), with Poisson-distributed audits of the banks asset value by the regulator, with the goal of eliminating (ameliorating) the incentives of levered bank shareholder/mangers to take excessive risks in their choice of underlying assets. The roles of (tax or other) subsidies on deposit interest payments by the ban, and of the auditing frequency are examined

Date: 2000-08
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/workingPapers/discussionPapers/fmg_pdfs/dp354.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Bank capital regulation with random audits (2002)
Working Paper: Bank Capital Regulation with Random Audits (2000)
Working Paper: Bank capital regulation with random audits (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fmg:fmgdps:dp354

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in FMG Discussion Papers from Financial Markets Group
Bibliographic data for series maintained by The FMG Administration ().