Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection

Fausto Panunzi and Mike Burkart

FMG Discussion Papers from Financial Markets Group

Abstract: This paper analyses the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, and outside ownership concentration. Legal protection affects both the expropriation of shareholders and the blockholders incentives to monitor. Because of this latter effect and its repercussion on managerial incentives, outside ownership concentration and legal shareholder protection can be both substitutes or complements. This holds irrespective of whether or not the large shareholder can reap private benefits. Moreover, better legal protection may exacerbate rather than alleviate the conflict of interest between large and small shareholders. In the extended framework with monetary incentives, ownership is fully dispersed when legal shareholder protection is strong. Otherwise, outside block ownership is optimal and is a substitute to legal protection when the law is of intermediate quality, while it is a complement when the law is poor.

Date: 2001-05
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Related works:
Journal Article: Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection (2006)
Working Paper: Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection (2006)
Working Paper: Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection (2001)
Working Paper: Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection (2001)
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