The Near Impossibility of Credit Rationing

David de Meza and David Webb ()

FMG Discussion Papers from Financial Markets Group

Abstract: Equilibrium credit rationing in the sense of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) implies the marginal cost of funds to the borrower is infinite. So borrowers have an overwhelming incentive to cut their loan by a dollar and thereby avoiding being rationed. Ways of doing this include scaling down the project, cutting consumption or infinitesimally delaying the project to accumulate more saving. All of these routes are normally feasible in which case credit rationing is impossible.

Date: 2003-07
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Working Paper: The near impossibility of credit rationing (2003)
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