Imperfect Common Knowledge in First Generation Models of Currency Crises

Gara Afonso

FMG Discussion Papers from Financial Markets Group

Abstract: First generation models assume that the level of reserves of a Central Bank in a fixed exchange rate regime is common knowledge among consummers, and therefore the timing of the attack on the currency, in an economy with persistent deficit, can be correctly anticipated. In these models, the collapse of the peg leads to no discrete change in the exchange rate. We relax the assumption of perfect information and introduce uncertainty about the willingness of a Central Bank to defend the peg. In this new setting, there is a unique equilibrium at which the fixed exchange is abandoned. In our model, the lack of common knowledge will lead to a discrete devaluation of the local currency once the peg finally collapses.

Date: 2006-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-fmk, nep-ifn and nep-mon
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Journal Article: Imperfect Common Knowledge in First-Generation Models of Currency Crises (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fmg:fmgdps:dp555

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