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Securitized Banking, Asymmetric Information, and Financial Crisis: Regulating Systemic Risk Away

Sudipto Bhattacharya, Georgy Chabakauri and Kjell Nyborg ()

FMG Discussion Papers from Financial Markets Group

Abstract: We develop a model of securitized (Originate, then Distribute) lending, in which both publicly observed aggregate shocks to values of securitized loan portfolios, and later some asymmetrically observed discernment of varying qualities of subsets thereof, play crucial roles. We nd that originators and potential buyers of such assets may di er in their preferences over their timing of trades, leading to a reduction in the aggregate surplus accruing from securitization. In addition, heterogeneity in sellers' selected timing of trades { arising from di erences in their ex ante beliefs { coupled with initial leverage choices based on pre-shock prices, may lead to nancial crises, implying uncoordinated asset liquidations inconsistent with any inter-temporal market equilibrium. We consider and contrast two mitigating regulatory interventions: leverage restrictions, and ex ante speci ed resale price guarantees on securitized asset portfolios. We show that the latter tool performs strictly better than the former, by ensuring not only bank survival, but also enhanced social surplus arising from securitized lending. It does so by inducing a more coordinated market equilibrium, that does not lead to interim leverage buildup to support a \cherry picking" seller trading strategy.

Date: 2012-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-cta and nep-fmk
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