The Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and Supervision in Europe

Rosa M. Lastra (r.lastra@qmul.ac.uk) and Dr Rosa Lastra

FMG Special Papers from Financial Markets Group

Abstract: This paper examines the unfinished agenda of the governance structure for financial regulation and supervision in Europe. In this unfinished agenda, there are two opposite forces at play: one that fosters greater centralisation and another one that promotes decentralisation with co-operation. I try to cast some light on this debate, by arguing that a single market with a single currency does need some common rules, but does not require a single supervisor. I also argue that the possible centralisation of one function (lender of last resort) does not imply nor require the centralisation of other supervisory functions.

Date: 2003-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/documents/specialPapers/2003/sp149.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fmg:fmgsps:sp149

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in FMG Special Papers from Financial Markets Group
Bibliographic data for series maintained by The FMG Administration (fmg@lse.ac.uk).