An Allocatively Efficient Auction Market for Payment Entitlements?

Kurt Nielsen (kun@foi.ku.dk) and Jesper Troelsgaard Nielsen
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Kurt Nielsen: Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen
Jesper Troelsgaard Nielsen: The Danish National Bank

No 03_2010, MSAP Working Paper Series from University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics

Abstract: We discuss the allocative efficiency of the market for the so-called Payment Entitlements that resulted from EU regulation no 796/2004 of the European agricultural policy. In particular we consider the existing market in Denmark and discuss the design of an allocative efficient auction market. The complexity of the market follows directly from initial construction of the payment entitlements, which resulted in a very large number of different payment entitlements. Although the valuation of the different payment entitlements are highly interrelated, they are separate goods that should be priced separately. We show how this complexity makes an allocative efficient auction market practically impossible and we suggest a simplified auction market that can improve the pricing and the transparency on the market for payment entitlements.

Keywords: Interrelated valuation; double auction; walrasian tatonnement; decoupled agricultural subsidies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 Q13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2010-03
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:foi:msapwp:03_2010

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