Dynamic implications of patenting for crop genetic resources

Bonwoo Koo and Brian Wright ()

No 51, EPTD discussion papers from International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)

Abstract: In a climate of rapid technological change, it is important to evaluate policies on the innovation incentives that result from the introduction of intellectual property rights as they relate to agricultural genetic resources. In this paper, we use a stylized model of cumulative innovation to explore the dynamics of introducing patent protection with licensing agreements, and then we contrast those results with the comparative-statics viewpoint. We also investigate the dynamic effects of claims on behalf of farmers on the profits of private crop breeders whose output is newly protected by patents. We show that the choices about patent life and licensing share that optimize worldwide dynamic social welfare can be quite different from the values that maximize steady-state social welfare. Further, recognition of farmers' rights entails a dynamic welfare loss to producers and consumers that is not revealed in a comparative-statics analysis.

Keywords: Plant breeding Technological innovations.; Plant genetic engineering Economic aspects.; Intellectual property. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/eptdp51.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fpr:eptddp:51

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in EPTD discussion papers from International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().