Corruption in Russia

Günther Schulze, Bambang Suharnoko Sjahrir and Nikita Zakharov

No 22, Discussion Paper Series from Department of International Economic Policy, University of Freiburg

Abstract: Analyzing law enforcement data on corruption incidents for a panel of 79 Russian regions for the period 2004-2007, we find that the relative salaries of bureaucrats determine corruption levels: Corruption declines as relative salaries rise up to a turning point, beyond which corruption rises again. Other important determinants are the strength of law enforcement, available rents through government budgets and natural resources, education levels, unemployment rates, and income inequality.

Keywords: Corruption; Russia; bureaucracy; law enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H10 K42 P26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2013-04, Revised 2013-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Corruption in Russia (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fre:wpaper:22

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