Conflitto sociale e incomparabilità dei beni (Social conflict and incomparability of goods)
Nicolò Bellanca ()
Working Papers - Economics from Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa
Abstract:
According to mainstream economics, rational agents choose among alternatives that are supposed to be ranked and compared. This assumption is strongly criticized by sociologists and anthropologists; it may partly hold true only when the commercial transactions sphere establishes a uniform measure: money. But what happens when a community compares social goods supplied by different institutional spheres? The rigorous equalization of any rate of exchange is replaced by a system of conventional equivalences. This system is temporary, since it changes as collective beliefs evolve; it is conflictual, because the "rates of conversion" between social goods often express relations of power among the groups themselves; and finally it is unstable, because individuals tend to develop private "rates of conversion” that are different from the collective ones. This system, despite its fragility, is a crucial tool of reproduction of a complex society. This essay discusses and analyzes some aspects of the issue.
Keywords: Incomparability; Rational Choice; Money; Conflict; Participation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D63 P51 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2008_02
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