Revenue Equalization Systems in a Federation with Tax Evasion

Lisa Grazzini and Alessandro Petretto ()

Working Papers - Economics from Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa

Abstract: We analyse how vertical or horizontal fiscal equalization affects the overprovision of local public goods due to vertical fiscal externality, when there is tax evasion. The regional governments overspending incentive is examined both in case of a fiscal equalization based on pretax earned income and reported taxable income.

Keywords: Fiscal federalism; Equalization; Marginal Cost of Public Funds, Tax evasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 H41 H71 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-pbe, nep-pub and nep-ure
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Related works:
Journal Article: Revenue Equalization Systems in a Federation with Tax Evasion (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2011_06.rdf

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