A Normative Justification of Compulsory Education
Alessandro Balestrino (),
Lisa Grazzini () and
Annalisa Luporini ()
Working Papers - Economics from Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa
Using a household production model of educational choices, we characterise a free market situation in which some agents ("high-wagers") educate their children full-time and spend a sizable amount of resources on them, while others ("low-wagers") educate them only partially. The free-market equilibrium is inefficient and iniquitous. Public policy is thus called for: however, redistributive taxation alone is counter-productive, as it forces some agents to move away from full-time education for their kids, and educational price subsidies are only moderately effective, since they only work on the intensive margin. It is instead socially optimal to introduce a compulsory education package, using a redistributive tax system to finance it. Redistributive taxation and compulsory education are therefore best seen as complementary policies.
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Journal Article: A normative justification of compulsory education (2017)
Working Paper: A normative justification of compulsory education (2017)
Working Paper: A Normative Justification of Compulsory Education (2015)
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