Resistance to Change in Recent Italy: Some Elements for a Theoretical Framework

Nicolò Bellanca () and Stefania Innocenti ()

Working Papers - Economics from Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa

Abstract: Italy is driving along a historical glide path. The main reason lies in the fact that in the country, especially in the last three decades, has experienced an extreme form of resistance to change. Everyone, when defecting, prefers that others defect as well, instead of cooperating. This paradoxical situation was denominated Low-Low Game by Gambetta and Origgi. In order to clarify how and why the Low-Low Game works, this paper uses parallel games. With the aim of explaining the origins, a theoretical framework based on the nexus between involuntary decisions and loss of power will be developed.

Keywords: Institutional change; Italy; Parallel games; Learned helplessness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2013
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