Compravendita o Donazione di Parti del Corpo Umano? Il Contributo di Alvin Roth e Dintorni

Nicolò Bellanca ()

Working Papers - Economics from Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa

Abstract: This article discusses Alvin Roth’s research about moneyless markets, and in particular about the manner in which kidneys are allocated to patients needing transplants. As Titmuss pointed out for blood transfusions, providing monetary incentives to blood donors may crowd out supply, since external rewards may crowd out intrinsic motivation. On the contrary, Roth argues than non-monetary but extrinsic incentives may have a positive effect on pro-social behavior without needing altruism. Developing Roth’s approach, this article analyzes what money cannot, and what should not, buy.

Keywords: Alvin Roth; moneyless market; matching market; pro-social behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 B31 D02 D47 D64 H44 I18 P46 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.disei.unifi.it/upload/sub/pubblicazioni/repec/pdf/wp02_2014.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2014_02.rdf

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers - Economics from Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa Via delle Pandette 9 50127 - Firenze - Italy. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Giorgio Ricchiuti ().