The modern theory of regulation as an inheritance of De Viti de Marco’s Cooperative State

Alessandro Petretto ()

Working Papers - Economics from Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa

Abstract: The aim of this article is to analyse the relationship between the thinking of a major public finance scholar in the Italian tradition, Antonio De Viti de Marco, and the foundations of the ‘new’ economic policy which, at the end of last century in most industrialised countries, generated a profound reorganization of markets, particularly those of Public Utilities (PU). Thus, we link the Monopolistic State (MS) and the Cooperative State (CS) configurations defined by De Viti with the views of state suggested by modern Political Economy theory. We argue that a pro-competitive PU regulation can be interpreted as a process of moving away from the main features of the MS to those of the CS. Finally, by following some of De Viti de Marco’s precise intuitions, we analyse the topic of enterprise ownership. In this exercise of economic analysis in retrospect we will not be looking at De Viti as a precursor, but we wish rather to emphasize the actuality of his main methodological approach to public finance.

Keywords: De Viti de Marco; Cooperative State; regulation; privatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B31 D72 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: The Modern Theory of Regulation as an Inheritance of De Viti de Marco?s Cooperative State (2014)
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