Self-Enforcing Family Rules, Marriage and the (non)Neutrality of Public Intervention

Alessandro Cigno, Mizuki Komura and Annalisa Luporini ()

Working Papers - Economics from Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa

Abstract: We demonstrate the existence of self-enforcing, renegotiation-proof family rules requiring adults to provide attention for their elderly parents in a model where individuals marry, and Nash-bargain the allocation of domestic resources with their partners. We show that public policy is neutralized by private action in some cases, but not in general.

Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Self-enforcing family rules, marriage and the (non)neutrality of public intervention (2017)
Working Paper: Self-Enforcing Family Rules, Marriage and the (Non)Neutrality of Public Intervention (2016)
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