Voting behaviour in the European Parliament and economic governance reform: does nationality matter?

Elisa Cencig and Laura Sabani

Working Papers - Economics from Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa

Abstract: This paper analyses MEPs’ voting behaviour on all regulations and directives forming the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack together with the key vote required to establish the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Whereas scholarly work has traditionally showed MEPs voting behaviour to be primarily driven by ideology (more specifically, by the MEP’s party group affiliation), we expect to find MEPs’ national origins to play a counterbalancing role and – at least partially – weaken intra-party position on key economic governance matters, where a conflict of interest might exist between creditor and debtor member countries. Logistic regressions were run to test our hypothesis and results do confirm that national interests and country-level economic variables can be strong predictors of MEPs’ votes in a considerable number of cases, opening up new avenues for future research on territorial cleavages in the European Parliament.

Keywords: European Union; crisis; econometrics; economics. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-eec
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Related works:
Journal Article: Voting Behaviour in the European Parliament and Economic Governance Reform: Does Nationality Matter? (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2016_13.rdf

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