Endogenous Public Evidence in Committee Persuasion Games and Private Communication

Luca Ferrari
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Luca Ferrari: Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa

Working Papers - Economics from Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa

Abstract: I extend a Jury decision making model allowing jurors to observe, in addition to their private information, public evidence strategically designed by a Prosecutor who wants to maximize the probability of conviction of a defendant under trial. I show that jurors’ communication, modeled as a non-binding straw vote before the final verdict, allows the Jury to force Prosecutor to supply evidence whose accuracy becomes perfect as the num- ber of jurors goes to infinity. Thus, the same outcome predicted by the Condorcet’s Jury Theorem is reached although evidence is strategically de- signed so as to prevent this outcome.

JEL-codes: D72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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