Plenty of Fish in the Sea: Divorce Choice and the Quality of Singles
Alessandro Tampieri () and
Elena Parilina ()
Working Papers - Economics from Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa
We analyze divorce choice when the population distribution is non stationary. We consider a non-transferable utility, three-period model where heterogeneous individuals may divorce the partner and re-enter the marriage market. Individualsâ€™choices are based on the change in the distribution of singles and the cost of waiting and divorcing, and take into account the individual ownâ€™s eligibility in the marriage market. We show the existence of â€œdivorceâ€ and â€œno divorceâ€ equilibria. Divorce emerges in the presence of asymmetry among spousesâ€™ types or in case of symmetry among medium-type spouses. Interestingly, lower divorce costs do not necessarily increase the probability of divorce. We then discuss how this framework can help interpreting the effects of divorce reforms on divorce rates.
Keywords: non-stationary distribution; divorce cost; waiting cost. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem, nep-law and nep-upt
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Journal Article: Plenty of Fish in the Sea: Divorce Choice and the Quality of Singles (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2018_07.rdf
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