Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information

Michele Gori

Working Papers - Economics from Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa

Abstract: We introduce and study a new property for social choice functions, called PC-strategy-proofness, which is weaker than strategy-proofness. A social choice function is PC-strategy-proof if it cannot be manipulated by an individual whose information about the preferences of the other members of the society is limited to the knowledge, for every pair of alternatives, of the number of individuals preferring the first alternative to the second one. We prove that, when at least three alternatives are considered, there is no Pareto optimal, anonymous and PC-strategy-proof social choice function.

Keywords: social choice function; manipulability; strategy-proofness; pairwise comparison; anonymity; Pareto optimality. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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