Mergers of Complements and Entry in Innovative Industries
Federico Etro ()
Working Papers - Economics from Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa
I study a merger between producers of complement inputs facing potential entry, with investment by the incumbents in deterministic cost reduction and by the entrants in probabilistic innovation, and then competition in prices. The merger solves Cournot complementarity problems in investment and pricing, which is what makes it profitable but also potentially anti-competitive. When the demand is inelastic the merger harms consumers by reducing R&D of the entrants if the incumbents are efficient enough (always when bundling is adopted). Instead, with a demand elastic enough, the merger increases consumer surplus (even with bundling).
Keywords: Mergers; R&D; Cournot complementarity; bundling; antitrustin high-tech industries. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-ino
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Journal Article: Mergers of complements and entry in innovative industries (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2019_15.rdf
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