Contests with sequential moves: An experimental study

Arthur Nelson and Dmitry Ryvkin

Working Papers from Department of Economics, Florida State University

Abstract: We study experimentally contests in which players make investment decisions sequentially, and information on prior investments is revealed between stages. Using a between-subject design, we consider all possible sequences in contests of three players and test two major comparative statics of the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium: The positive effect of information disclosure on aggregate investment and earlier mover advantage. The former prediction is decidedly rejected, as we observe a reduction in aggregate investment when more information is sequentially disclosed. The evidence on earlier mover advantage is mixed but mostly does not support theory as well. Both predictions rely critically on forward-looking, sophisticated decision-making, which is not typical for our subjects.

Keywords: contest; sequential moves; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C99 D82 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15
Date: 2019-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://coss.fsu.edu/econpapers/wpaper/wp2019_11_01.pdf First version, 2019-11

Related works:
Working Paper: Contests with sequential moves: An experimental study (2024)
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