Ownership, Efficiency, and Political Interference
Working Papers from Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics
Privatisation is often explained by a desire to achieve efficiency. This paper presents conditions under which political interference yields higher welfare than under commercial objectives, and vice versa. If effort affects utility, interference may be beneficial in a seemingly perfect market.
Keywords: EFFICIENCY; PRIVATIZATION; PUBLIC OWNERSHIP (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L32 L33 L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aascbu:00-6
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