Inefficient National Environmental Regulation as a Signal of High Abatement Costs

U. Steiner

Working Papers from Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyses the importance of informational asymmetries in international environmental regulation by use of a game theoretic approach of signalling games.

Keywords: ENVIRONMENTAL; POLICY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 F30 Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aascbu:97-2

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