Inefficient National Environmental Regulation as a Signal of High Abatement Costs
Working Papers from Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics
This paper analyses the importance of informational asymmetries in international environmental regulation by use of a game theoretic approach of signalling games.
Keywords: ENVIRONMENTAL; POLICY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 Q20 F30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aascbu:97-2
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