Rules Versus Discretion: Favouritism and the Use of Requirements of Formal Qualifications

K. Snellman

Working Papers from Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics

Abstract: The recruitment of new employees is analysed in a theoritical model. It is shown that it can be optimal to implement requirements of formal qualifications for jobs, although it would be possible for the manager to find applicants who have a higher expected ability but no formal qualifications.

Keywords: ASYMETRIC INFORMATION; LABOUR MARKET; RECRUITMENT (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D82 J39 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aascbu:98-12

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