International Emission Trading Systems: Trade Level and Political Acceptability

J.-T. Boom and G.T. Svendsen

Working Papers from Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics

Abstract: The Kyoto Protocol of December 1997 allows emission trade between countries that have committed themselves to an emission ceiling. This paper considers two schemes of emission trading: trade between goverments and trade between emision sources. The two schemes are analyzed and the strengths and weaknesses of the two schemes are compared in a public choice setting which focuses on group size, selective incentives, entrepreneurship and lobbyism from industry.

Keywords: POLLUTION; PUBLIC GOODS; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 Q25 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aascbu:99-11

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