Intertemporal Equilibrium with Myopic Altruism

Stéphane Lambrecht, Philippe Michel and Emmanuel Thibault

G.R.E.Q.A.M. from Universite Aix-Marseille III

Abstract: We modify the altruistic model by assuming that income, instead of the heir's utility, enters the altruist's utility function. We name this formulation "myopic" because, unlike in Barro's (1974) model, the altruist does not need to foresee into the indenite future to make his decisions. We analyze the equilibrium dynamics of an OLG model with individuals motivated by myopic altruism. We derive conditions for existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. Unlike in Barro's model, there may exist multiple steady state equilibria with operative altruism.

Keywords: ECONOMIC MODELS; INCOME; UTILITY FUNCTIONS; ALTRUISM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 D64 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aixmeq:00a24

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