Stability of Coalition Structures and the Principle of Optimal Partitioning
Michel Le Breton () and
Shlomo Weber ()
G.R.E.Q.A.M. from Universite Aix-Marseille III
Keywords: economic; models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
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Working Paper: Stability of Coalition Structures and the Principle of Optimal Partitioning (1992)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aixmeq:95a06
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