Moral Hazard in Teams with Uncertainty, and Transfers of Repetition as Enforcement Mechanisms

Claude d'Aspremont and Louis-André Gérard-Varet

G.R.E.Q.A.M. from Universite Aix-Marseille III

Keywords: MORAL; HAZARD (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 1995
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Working Paper: Moral Hazard in Teams with Uncertainty, and Transfers or Repetition as Enforcement Mechanisms (1994)
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