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Equivalence of Strong and Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria in Games without Spillovers

Michel Le Breton (), Hideo Konishi () and Shlomo Weber ()

G.R.E.Q.A.M. from Universite Aix-Marseille III

Keywords: GAME THEORY; ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 1995
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Journal Article: Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers (*) (1996)
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