Incentives for Wage Maximisers and Internal Bargaining Firms

Alan Kirman and D. Suvakovic

G.R.E.Q.A.M. from Universite Aix-Marseille III

Abstract: The paper proposes a simple mechanism, also applicable to certain models of internal bargaining, that induces firms to eliminate practically all efficiency losses and to react normally to changes in exogeneous variables.

Keywords: BARGAINING; WAGES; FISCAL POLICY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 H32 J50 J53 J54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aixmeq:96a19

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