The Timing of Wage Payments, Historic Labor Costs, and Marx's Surplus Value Accounts of Exploitation

D. Suvakovic

G.R.E.Q.A.M. from Universite Aix-Marseille III

Abstract: This paper re-examines Marx's exploitation theory based on his index of surplus value, identified with the outcome of the labor exchange between workers and capitalists. It is found that the magnitude of Marxian exploitation, and sometimes also its algebraic sign, depend on the timing of wage payments, specified by the labor contract. Implications for Marx's doctrine are discussed.

Keywords: SOCIALISM; MARXISM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B12 B14 B24 B31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aixmeq:96c03

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