Confiance et equilibre economique

Damien Gaumont and Philippe Michel

G.R.E.Q.A.M. from Universite Aix-Marseille III

Abstract: This paper analyses the consequences of trust for the general equilibrium in an exchange economy. Trust is viewed as a gift of information which modifies the caracteristics of goods a la Stigler-Becker. The increase in utility due to the increase in information is modified by its consequences on the equilibrium. This increase in utility may be strengthened, reduced or neutralized. The study of Effective Information Gift (EIG) is general. In a simple example, it caracterizes all cases of gains and/or losses in utility for two agents and two goods.

Keywords: GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM; ASYMETRIC INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 D12 D5 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aixmeq:96c06

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in G.R.E.Q.A.M. from Universite Aix-Marseille III G.R.E.Q.A.M., (GROUPE DE RECHERCHE EN ECONOMIE QUANTITATIVE D'AIX MARSEILLE), CENTRE DE VIEILLE CHARITE, 2 RUE DE LA CHARITE, 13002 MARSEILLE.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().