Fondements des Concepts de Solution en Theorie des Jeux

O De Wolf

G.R.E.Q.A.M. from Universite Aix-Marseille III

Abstract: In this paper we study the players' reasoning in nomral form games. To this end we generalize the concept of objective correlated equilibrium distributions introduced by Aumann (1987) to the subjective case.

Keywords: GAMES; STATISTICS; ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aixmeq:97a10

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