Unique Implementation in Auctions and in Public Goods Problems

Claude d'Aspremont, Jacques Crémer () and Louis-André Gérard-Varet

G.R.E.Q.A.M. from Universite Aix-Marseille III

Abstract: We present new conditions that guarantee the existence of mechanism with a unique or essentially unique equilibrium in auction and public goods problems with quasi-linear utility functions. These conditions bear only on the information structures of the agents.

Keywords: AUCTIONS; PUBLIC GOODS; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 1997
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Related works:
Working Paper: Unique implementation in auctions and in public goods problems (2005)
Working Paper: Unique implementation in auctions and in public goods problems (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aixmeq:97a15

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