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The Leverage Theory of Tying Revisited

Margaret Slade ()

G.R.E.Q.A.M. from Universite Aix-Marseille III

Abstract: I assess the private profitability of tying under circumstances where the standard efficiency defenses do not necessarily hold and demonstrate that tying is profitable under a wide range of circumstances. I also examine data from the Canadian newspaper-advertising industry and argue that price discrimination, cost saving, and quality control are unlikely motives for tying in this market. Nevertheless, with newspapers, tying and monopoly power go hand in hand.

Keywords: ANTITRUST LEGISLATION; MARKET STRUCTURE; MANUFACTURING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 L1 L4 L6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 1995
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aixmeq:97b02

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