Connaissance commune, hierarchie des croyances et incertitude endogene: un exemple economique (oligopole)

J. Voranger and P. Maitre

G.R.E.Q.A.M. from Universite Aix-Marseille III

Abstract: Cette note est centree sur la notion de connaissance commune en rapport avec la theorie des jeux. Elle illustre a travers un exemple economique la theorie proposee par S.R. Werlang (1989).

Keywords: THEORIE DES JEUX; OLIGOPOLES; STRUCTURES DES MARCHES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aixmeq:98a44

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