Liability, Competition and Environmental Risk: Identical Agents, Different Behaviors

Gerard Mondello and Antoine Soubeyran

G.R.E.Q.A.M. from Universite Aix-Marseille III

Abstract: In this paper we show that a strict liability fine, established on the marginal damages caused by production act as a mean to discriminate between firms. More precisely, facing a potential risk, understood as a random negative externality, "ex ante" identical rival firms playing on a competitive market may choose different risky and costly technologies.

Keywords: UNCERTAINTY; TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE; ENVIRONMENT; LIABILITY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 D81 K32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aixmeq:99a01

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