Should Education be Taxed when Agents are Altruistic?

V. Barthelemy

G.R.E.Q.A.M. from Universite Aix-Marseille III

Abstract: We consider an overlapping generations model to study the effect of the educational system on growth and on the optimal educational policies when individuals are altruistic. The teaching efficiency depends on the teacher to pupil ratio; given a number of teachers, the number of students has a negative effect on the accumulation of human capital. This negative, intragenerational externality consists in a congestion effect of the educational system which may lead to overeducation. The model also assumes the existence of an intergenerational, positive externality which depends both on average human capital and on familial human capital.

Keywords: EDUCATION; EXTERNALITIES; EDUCATIONAL POLICY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E62 H21 I28 J22 O4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aixmeq:99a09

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