Controlling Risk Selction Incentives when Health Insurance Contracts are Endogenous

William Jack

Working Papers from Australian National University - Department of Economics

Abstract: The paper examines the nature of health insurance contracts when insurance companies are forced to pool high and low risk individuals. Insureres have an incentive to design contracts so as to attract only better brisks, and equilibrium contracts are generally characterised by less coevrage and lower cost-reducing effort on the part of the insurer than in the absence of these incentives. Public transfers positively related to claims tend to increase coverage but reduce effort, si the optimal transfer rate may be positive or negative.

Keywords: RISK; HEALTH INSURANCE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 I1 L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aunaec:341

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Australian National University - Department of Economics THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, RESEARCH SCHOOL of PACIFIC STUDIES, RESEARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, G.P.O. 4, CANBERRA ACT 2601 AUSTRALIA..O. BOX 4 CANBERRA 2601 AUSTRALIA.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().