Quantity Competition With Access Fees
M. Harrison and
Jeffrey Kline
Working Papers from Australian National University - Department of Economics
Abstract:
We analyze an oligopoly model where firms choose both quantities and access fees. Per unit prices are determined endogenously to equate quantity demanded with quantity supplied at each firm. In a Nash equilibrium of the game played by firms, the per unit prices equal mairginal cost and access fees may or may not extract all consumer surplus.
Keywords: OLIGOPOLIES; PRICES; GAME THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Journal Article: Quantity competition with access fees (2001) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aunaec:358
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