Auctions of Identical Objects with Single-Unit Demands: a Survey

Flavio Menezes

Working Papers from Australian National University - Department of Economics

Abstract: The theory of auctions of a single object generalizes to a situation where identical objects are sold either sequentially or simultaneously but individuals can only buy one object. In this context, I will present a survey of the main results regarding the ranking of auctions based on revenue, bidding behaviour, effects of entry fees and reserve prices, and other strategic issues.

Keywords: AUCTIONS; PRICES; RISK (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aunaec:363

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Australian National University - Department of Economics THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, RESEARCH SCHOOL of PACIFIC STUDIES, RESEARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, G.P.O. 4, CANBERRA ACT 2601 AUSTRALIA..O. BOX 4 CANBERRA 2601 AUSTRALIA.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().