Central Bank Independence, Centralization of Wage Bargaining, Inflation and Unemployment: Theory and Evidence
Alex Cukierman () and
Working Papers from Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi
This paper proposes a conceptual framework that makes it possible to investigate the effects of central bank independence, the degree of centralization of wage bargaining and the interaction between those institutional variables on the real wage, unemployment and inflation. This is done by considering a two-stage strategic interaction between a central bank (CB) with a given degree of conservativeness and a number of unions each of which sets its own nominal wage taking the nominal wages of other unions and the reaction-function of the CB as given.
Keywords: CENTRAL BANKS; WAGES; BARGAINING; INFLATION; UNEMPLOYMENT (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 E31 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Central Bank Independence, Centralization of Wage Bargaining, Inflation and Unemployment: Theory and Evidence (1998)
Working Paper: Central Bank Independence, Centralization of Wage Bargaining, Inflation and Unemployment - Theory and Evidence (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:banita:332
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