Median Voter Preferences, Central Bank Independence and Conservatis

Francesco Lippi

Working Papers from Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi

Abstract: This paper studies how the independence and conservatism of a central bankrelate to the structure and stability of median voter preferences. This is done by means of a model of endogenous delegation in which an opportunistic policy-maker chooses the monetary regime (independence and conservatism) to maximise the welfare of median voter.

Keywords: CENTRAL BANKS; ELECTIONS; MEDIAN VOTER (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Median Voter Preferences, Central Bank Independence and Conservatism (2000)
Working Paper: Median Voter Preferences, Central Bank Independence and Conservatism (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:banita:351

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