Repeated Play of Potential Games

Y.M. Ermoliev and Sjur Flåm

Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen

Abstract: So-called potential functions are important, prominent, and common to many diverses fields, including optimization, dynamic processes, and physics. Monderer and Shapley have recently added a class of noncooperative games to that list. We extend their notion and consider repeated play of games having potentials. Numerous modes of play are shown to yield Nash equilibrium in the long run. We provide a unified convergence analysis and point to procedures that account for efficiency and viability.

Keywords: GAME; THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bereco:0100

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