Hospital Reimbursement in an Oligopolistic Industry

Kurt Brekke ()

Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen

Abstract: This paper analyses the design of hospital reimbursement in an industry with imperfect competition, scarcity of labour and socially costly government transfers. We find that prospective payment not only increases the quantity of hospital care, but also the quality if quality improvements are valued sufficiently high by the patients.

Keywords: HOSPITALS; OLIGOPOLIES; INDUSTRY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 I11 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bereco:0200

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