Oligopolies With Set-Valued Inverse Demand

Sjur Flåm, L. Mallozzi and Jacqueline Morgan

Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen

Abstract: This note deals with Cournot type oligopolies in which the market clearing price occasionally may be non-unique. A Stackelberg leading producer is present. Given that setting we explore continuity properties of the followers' reaction and provide sufficient conditions for existence of equilibrium.

Keywords: OLIGOPOLES; PRICES; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bereco:0301

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