Greenhouse Gases, Cooperation and Exchange

Sjur Flåm

Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen

Abstract: Emission of uniformly dispersed greenhouse gases in construed here as a cooperative production game, featuring side-payments, quata exchange, uncertainty, and multi-period planning. Stochastic programming offers good instruments to analyze such games. Absent efficient markets for emissions, such programming may help to imitate market-like, price-based transfers among concerned parties.

Keywords: PRODUCTION; GAMES; POLLUTION; MARKET (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 Q48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bereco:0401

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen Department of Economics, University of Bergen Fosswinckels Gate 6. N-5007 Bergen, Norway. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().