Equilibrium Selection under Different Learning Modes in Supermodular Games

Oddvar Kaarboe () and Alexander Tieman

Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen

Abstract: We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed by recent evolutionary literature to the class of strict supermodular games when two simple behavior rules coexist in the population, imitation and myopic optimization.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; LEARNING; EXPECTATIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D83 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bereco:1299

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen Department of Economics, University of Bergen Fosswinckels Gate 6. N-5007 Bergen, Norway. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().