Information Rent and Technology Choice in a Regulated Firm

Steinar Vagstad

Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen

Abstract: Regulated firms are not necessarily willing to invest in cost minimizing technologies, but evaluate different technologies according to their impact on the information rent. In a two-type adverse selection model three kinds of investments are considered: investments that increase the probability of having low costs; investments that reduce the cost of low-cost types; and investments that reduce the cost of high-costs types.

Keywords: REGULATION; INVESTMENTS; INFORMATION; TECHNOLOGY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D83 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bereco:173

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